Floor prices for alcohol, beneath which alcohol cannot be sold, are in place in Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, some US states (eg, Connecticut), and eight of the ten Canadian provinces. In 2012, Scotland legislated alcohol minimum unit pricing-a lowest price per unit of alcohol-the introduction of which is pending legal challenge. In the UK, minimum unit pricing is the subject of substantial political and policy debate. UK alcohol prices in the off -trade, particularly supermarkets, have risen more slowly than have taxes on alcohol. 1 Harmful drinkers favour cheap off -trade alcohol, 2 which is targeted by minimum unit pricing. Drinkers on low income also favour cheap alcohol. 3 The UK Government reneged on its plans to introduce a minimum unit price of £0·45, citing concerns that responsible drinkers on a low income might be disadvantaged. 4 However, the burden of minimum unit pricing on people from lowincome groups would be small, at worst. 5, 6 People from low socioeconomic status backgrounds have fewer resources to protect themselves from the ill eff ects of drinking, and have high levels of alcohol-related mortality and hospital admission at all levels of drinking compared with people from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds. 7 In The Lancet, John Holmes and colleagues 8 report their assessment of the eff ect of the proposed £0·45 minimum unit price in England as a function of income and socioeconomic status, based on their Sheffi eld Alcohol Policy Model. This model combines an econometric model, which relates changes in the price of alcohol to changes in alcohol consumption, and an epidemiological model, which translates alcohol consumption to mortality and morbidity. In response to the minimum unit price, the study predicts that harmful drinkers in the lowest income quintile would reduce their annual alcohol consumption by 7·6% (about 4 weeks' worth of alcohol) and spend less on alcohol overall, whereas harmful drinkers in the highest quintile would only reduce their consumption by 1%. Responsible drinkers in the lowest quintile would reduce consumption by 1·6% and also spend less on alcohol.
Public health outcomes were predicted by occupation or socioeconomic status. In Holmes and colleagues' study 8 the lowest socioeconomic groups made up about 41% of the population, but were estimated to account for 59% of the alcoholassociated health costs. 10 years after introduction of minimum unit pricing, annual alcohol-related health costs for this group were reduced by 4·7%; this reduction accounting for 88% of population-wide savings. The study assumed that retailers would only increase prices to the minimum threshold, providing a conservative estimate of the eff ect of minimum unit pricing. Canada's experience is that retailers also increase the price of more expensive forms of alcohol to maintain relative price structures. 9 The Sheffi eld Alcohol Policy Model would ideally be built on a dataset including people's alcohol purchases, consumption, location of purchase, and price. purchased off -trade and on-trade and prices paid). Government and other funders of research should prioritise collection of such data to inform evidencebased policy decisions. The econometric model centres on estimates of people's responsiveness to changes in the price of alcohol. In the absence of data that follow individuals over time, the Sheffi eld Alcohol Policy Model uses a pseudo-panel built from repeated cross-sectional data (the UK Living Costs and Food Survey), and estimates a set of measures of price responsiveness for on-trade and off -trade beverages, controlling for age, sex, and birth year of the purchaser. To predict eff ects of minimum unit pricing on alcohol consumption, the model assumes that drinkers with a preference for packaged beer from supermarkets, for example, respond in the same way, irrespective of their income and pattern of alcohol consumption. No data exist to support or refute this assumption.
A methodological limitation of the analysis is that changes in the highest daily consumption were based on changes in average consumption, despite some evidence that risky single-occasion drinking is less responsive to price changes than is average consumption. 10 The model translates estimated changes in alcohol consumption to mortality and disease prevalence for 47 chronic and acute conditions based on the published literature, with the same risk curves for mortality and morbidity. The authors acknowledge that recent meta-analyses have found diff erent risks of mortality and morbidity for some illnesses. 11 Holmes and colleagues' study follows a well-accepted approach for dealing with uncertainty in modelling, and undertakes sensitivity analysis. For example, when combining the consumption and purchase datasets it considers the possibility that people buy alcohol for others, and it also considers the possibility of under-reporting of alcohol consumption in the General Lifestyle Survey.
Stakeholders in the UK minimum unit pricing policy debate regard the predictions made by the Sheffi eld Alcohol Policy Model that are specifi c to the UK as more relevant than assessments of fl oor prices in other jurisdictions. 12 This study provides persuasive evidence that the proposed £0·45 minimum unit price will have little eff ect on what low-income moderate drinkers drink and spend on alcohol. Rather, it targets individuals least able to protect themselves from the ill eff ects of harmful drinking. Of further benefi t, families containing harmful drinkers stand to gain from the decreased likelihood of loss of income through the drinker's death, injury, or illness and reduced risk of domestic violence. 13 Furthermore, the potential reduction in government spending on health care could result in lower taxes and charges and expanded government services. Holmes and colleagues' fi ndings 8 should assuage the UK Government's concerns and provide further support for proponents of minimum unit pricing in this hotly argued debate.
